Skip to content

FRAUDULENT ORDERS EXECUTED BY THE BANK: WHO IS LIABLE?

Examined through three judgments handed down by the Federal Supreme Court

I. Introduction

This contribution addresses a topical issue frequently encountered in the case law of the Federal Supreme Court in recent months, namely the determination of liability – that of the bank or that of the client – where fraudulent orders have been executed by the bank.

The first part will present the three-step reasoning developed by the Federal Supreme Court to determine whether the bank or the client is to be held liable when fraudulent orders have been executed.

The second part will set out and comment on three recent judgments handed down by the Federal Supreme Court, which examine the case at hand according to a three-step reasoning. Brief remarks and recommendations for banks and clients will follow each judgment.

II. The three-step reasoning developed by the Federal Supreme Court

In ATF 146 III 121 of 10 December 2019, discussed in III. A. below, the Federal Supreme Court devised the three-step method, which is to be followed when adjudicating a case concerning fraudulent orders that were nonetheless executed.

The first step consists in determining whether the orders were executed with or without a mandate from the bank’s client, which amounts to examining whether they were executed in accordance with the client’s instructions.

Where the client is represented, the authority of the representative in relation to the person represented must then be examined, which leads in particular to the question of whether the bank’s good faith may be protected.

The second step provides that, where there is no mandate from the client for the execution of the disputed order, the court must examine whether a risk transfer clause exists and, if so, whether it places the loss suffered on the client.

In the absence of such a clause, the loss suffered as a result of the execution of the disputed order is the bank’s loss.

The third and final step, which is only to be examined where the bank has suffered a loss, allows the bank to raise a set-off claim against its client by relying on breaches of contract committed by the client that contributed to causing or aggravating the loss suffered by the bank.

III. The three-step reasoning in light of three judgments handed down by the Federal Supreme Court

A. ATF 146 III 121 of 10 December 2019

1. The facts

The client of a bank had granted a general and unlimited power of attorney over two of her accounts to a “long-time friend”, who was introduced to the bank as such.

Over a period of more than two years, the representative thus misappropriated approximately CHF 13 million by means of 14 transfer orders in favour of his own account held with the same bank or with a third-party bank, as well as in favour of a joint account held with his wife at the same bank as the client.

The amounts withdrawn from the represented client’s bank accounts served, among other things, as security for the loans that the bank granted to the representative.

One of the 14 transfers made by the representative was executed via e-banking, the client having given him her access codes.

The two successive managers of the client’s accounts, for their part, never contacted her directly. Although one of the managers had doubts about the transfers made by the representative, he merely contacted the representative.

2. The law

The central question was the following: can the bank rely on its good faith so as not to have to repay an amount of nearly CHF 13 million to its client?

In its analysis of the first step, the Federal Supreme Court recalls that, in banking, the authority conferred by a client on a representative is usually granted by means of a pre-printed power of attorney subject to the rules of Art. 32 para. 1 in conjunction with Art. 33 para. 2 CO and Art. 33 para. 3 CO.

In the event of an abuse of the power of representation, the representative, who in reality never intended to act on behalf of the person represented, merely uses the appearance created by the authority communicated to the third party in order to act unlawfully and solely in his own interest. In such circumstances, the third party – here, the bank – may be precluded from relying on its good faith where it has failed to exercise the diligence required by the circumstances within the meaning of Art. 3 para. 2 CC.

In the present case, thirteen of the disputed orders given by the representative arose in a particular context, since the amounts withdrawn from the client’s account served to secure loans granted by the bank to the representative. The bank was therefore faced with a conflict of interest, a situation that required it to be particularly vigilant.

Although he had doubts about the representative’s authority to make the disputed transfers, the manager of the client’s account did not carry out checks with the client directly, but only with the representative, which cannot be regarded as sufficient, all the more so since the representative emptied the client’s account entirely.

Accordingly, the Federal Supreme Court held that the bank had not exercised the diligence that the circumstances required of it. In view of the circumstances, it should have carried out additional checks with the client.

Thus, the 13 transfers were made without a mandate from the client.

The transfer made by the representative via the e-banking platform, on the other hand, was executed by the bank on the client’s mandate, since it was impossible for the bank to know that the order had in fact been given by the representative.

In examining the second step, the Federal Supreme Court held that there was no risk transfer clause, so that the loss resulting from the 13 undue transfers is the bank’s loss.

As regards the last step, the Federal Supreme Court found that the bank had not shown that it had alleged the facts or produced the evidence needed to establish the existence and amount of its set-off claim against the client, so that its set-off claim against the client was dismissed.

3. Significance of the judgment

The existence of a general and unlimited power of attorney therefore does not allow the bank to rely on its good faith in all cases where fraudulent transfers are ordered by a representative.

Where persons within the bank have doubts as to the representative’s legitimacy to place certain orders, the order should not be executed and checks should immediately be carried out with the client directly, not with the representative, all the more so where the bank has a conflict of interest with the representative.

However, in the case of transfers made via e-banking, the bank’s good faith is more readily accepted, insofar as the bank cannot know that the representative is the person who actually gave the order, since the client is not supposed to hand over his or her passwords and/or access codes to the representative. In such cases, the transfers will probably often be regarded as having been executed by the bank on the client’s mandate.

Finally, this judgment recalls that the bank must allege the facts and produce the evidence necessary to establish the existence and amount of the claim it intends to assert against its client, and must do so from the outset of the proceedings before the cantonal courts. Failing this, its set-off claim will be dismissed.

B. Federal Supreme Court judgments 4A_178/2019 and 4A_192/2019 of 6 August 2020

1. The facts

The appellant company held accounts with the bank. According to the contractual documentation, the company was validly represented only where the joint signature of two persons appeared. Moreover, no order could be placed by e-mail.

For more than ten years, orders had always been transmitted via e-banking, never by e-mail or by telephone.

In 2014, the company fell victim to a “CEO fraud”. A fraudster posed as a lawyer during a telephone call with the company’s accountant, and then as the company’s CEO in an e-mail sent to the bank.

Convinced that she was in contact with a lawyer acting in the company’s interests, the accountant followed the fraudster’s instructions and transmitted the five requested orders to the bank. At no point did the employee refer the matter to the head of the accounting department.

As the client’s usual account manager was absent, his replacement proposed, in view of the urgency of the situation presented to him, that the order which the accountant would give to the bank by simple e-mail confirmed by telephone be confirmed by a second person at the company.

Thus, the accountant was to give the order by e-mail and then confirm it by telephone. The order was then to be confirmed by an e-mail sent by a second person – in this case the fraudster, who posed as the CEO.

The e-mail address used by the fraudster did not match the e-mail addresses of the company’s other employees. As for the content of the confirmation e-mails sent by the purported CEO, they contained spelling mistakes.

2. The law

The Federal Supreme Court had to determine whether the bank’s fault could break the chain of causation between the fault committed by the company’s employee and the loss.

As regards the first step, the judges at Mon Repos note that the procedure agreed between the parties for binding the company was neither followed nor complied with by the bank, since a joint signature of two persons – in particular the accountant and the CEO – had to appear on the order, which could under no circumstances be placed by e-mail.

The bank employee was satisfied with an e-mail from the accountant, confirmed by telephone, and an e-mail from the purported CEO.

The bank therefore executed the five disputed orders without a mandate.

As regards the second step, the Federal Supreme Court notes that the bank and the company had not agreed on a risk transfer clause, so that the loss is to be borne by the bank.

It was in the context of the third step that the judges examined the bank’s concurrent fault, in order to determine whether that fault should be regarded as a factor breaking the adequate causal connection or merely as a factor reducing the compensation owed to the client.

In the present case, the client breached its contractual obligations, since the accountant induced the bank employee to depart from the agreed system of representation, namely a joint signature by two persons. Nevertheless, the Federal Supreme Court considers that the concurrent faults of the bank and its associates broke the adequate causal connection between this breach of contractual obligations and the loss.

The bank employee proposed to the accountant a procedure that did not comply with the procedure agreed for binding the company, namely a joint handwritten signature by two persons.

The purported CEO’s e-mails were also suspicious, as the e-mail address did not match that of the company’s staff. As for the content of the e-mails, it contained spelling and syntax errors, which was unusual, since the company and the CEO were Swiss.

The orders were, moreover, unusual by reason of the means used – since they had not been transmitted via the e-banking platform – as well as of their amount and their frequency.

Consequently, the bank must bear the entire loss alone, since the faults attributable to the accountant and the client appear remote in the chain of causes that led to the loss, even though, without them, the fraud would not have occurred.

3. Significance of the judgment

It follows from this judgment that, even where a fault of the client lies at the origin of the bank’s loss, the bank must in all cases comply with the procedures put in place and agreed with its client for binding the client, failing which it risks bearing the loss alone. Thus, even in an urgent situation alleged by the client, the bank must not depart from the agreed contractual rules.

The bank must also pay attention to its clients’ habits (manner of expression, addresses used, frequency of contacts and orders, amount of orders, destination of the transfer).

C. Judgment 4A_9/2020 of 9 July 2020

1. The facts

According to the account opening documents of a client of a securities trading company, the parties had agreed on a release for orders transmitted by telephone, telecopy, fax and e-mail. Under this release, the “client expressly authorises the company to accept instructions given, in particular, by e-mail and to execute [them] immediately, in any circumstances whatsoever, even if they are not followed by written confirmation. The client declares that he assumes all risks, even in the event of an error on the part of the company as to his identity, and releases the company from all liability in this respect for any loss he may incur” (our translation).

During the year preceding the disputed orders, the client gave two transfer orders by e-mail.

In December 2015, the client allegedly sent eight e-mails from the e-mail address provided to the trading company, asking it to execute the transfers expressly specified.

In January 2016, the trading company received new e-mails from an e-mail address slightly different from the one usually used by the client. The trading company then blocked all transfer orders and contacted the client.

2. The law

As regards the first step, the Federal Supreme Court held that the disputed orders placed in December 2015 came from unknown persons, so that they had been executed without a mandate from the client.

The second step involves examining the existence and validity of a risk transfer clause agreed between the parties, by analogous application of Arts 100 and 101 para. 3 CO.

The Federal Supreme Court first notes that risk transfer clauses – which cannot extend to cases of gross negligence on the part of the bank – are common in relationships between a bank (or a trading company acting as a bank) and its client. The bank’s fault amounts to gross negligence, and the bank is liable, where the examination it carries out reveals serious indications that the e-mail address – and hence the identity – has been usurped (e-mail address used, content of the e-mail or destination of the transfer).

In the present case, the parties had concluded a “release” under which the client accepts that instructions given by e-mail are to be executed immediately, in any circumstances. The client thus agrees to bear all the resulting risks, with the exception of losses resulting from gross negligence on the part of the bank.

The Federal Supreme Court ruled out gross negligence on the part of the bank, on the grounds that since the beginning of the contractual relationship between the parties – i.e. just over a year earlier – all exchanges had taken place by e-mail, using the e-mail address provided by the client himself and used for the fraudulent orders sent in December 2015. The errors contained in the e-mails were not to be regarded as serious indications, since the previous e-mails contained similar errors. The disputed transfers were made to a well-known bank in the United Kingdom and not to an “exotic” bank. Finally, the trading company had never undertaken to verify the identity of the ultimate beneficiary.

For these reasons, the trading company was not grossly negligent, which means that the client bears the entire loss.

3. Significance of the judgment

This judgment shows that risk transfer clauses, although they do not extend to gross negligence on the part of the bank, can have serious consequences for a client whose e-mail address is hacked through no fault of his or her own.

Great care should therefore be taken where orders may be transmitted by e-mail, since gross negligence on the part of the bank is not readily established – in particular, only where serious indications of usurpation emerge.

IV. Conclusion

In view of the foregoing, it is for banks to pay attention to the details of a banking relationship and to their clients’ habits. As soon as the slightest suspicion of a fraudulent transaction arises, the bank must immediately make enquiries and contact its client directly.

Clients, for their part, should be wary of orders that may be transmitted solely by e-mail and without subsequent verification since, where there is a risk transfer clause, the courts only rarely find gross negligence on the part of the bank.

The content of this article does not constitute legal advice. One of the following lawyers will be pleased to advise you on your particular situation: